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This paper explores philanthropic links between the Chinese diaspora and the People’s Republic 
of China. Drawing on published sources and on interviews with some protagonists, it attempts to 
sketch the range and nature of those links, in the context of shifting international commercial and 
political relations and ‘globalisation’ processes. 
 
An undertaking of this kind is beset by several conceptual difficulties.  We do not propose to 
examine these in detail, but it is as well to note them at the outset, and to state what positions we 
have chosen to take. 
 
Firstly, what is ‘philanthropy’?  Use of the term in a transnational context presupposes that it 
meaningfully identifies common ground in distinct historical, cultural and religious traditions. 
We work with this presupposition rather than examining it.  Yet it is almost immediately 
apparent that ‘philanthropy’ often shades into, or departs from ‘self-help’ or ‘mutual aid’ on the 
one hand (as, for example, in giving to or through kinship networks), and may mesh with the 
pursuit of commercial or political advantage on the other (as in wealthy individuals making 
charitable donations with an eye to improving government and corporate relations). We make no 
normative judgements about this, not least because any attempt to pronounce on what is ‘real’ 
philanthropy would entail immersion in ethical puzzles that have plagued moral philosophers for 
millennia.  By ‘philanthropy’, therefore, we simply refer to the private and voluntary transfer of 
resources (money, goods, services, knowledge, skills or time) for the benefit of others, 
irrespective of either the motives of the donor or any benefits that may accrue to the donor. 
 
Secondly, what is ‘China’?   Whether we are disposed to regard it primarily as a place, a 
civilisation, a culture, an empire, a nation or a race, it is clear that the literal and imagined 
boundaries of China have shifted substantially over the centuries. Consulting an atlas to 
determine the present borders of the People’s Republic is not necessarily helpful, since there are 
those who would argue passionately that some areas within those borders – notably, Tibet – are 
not ‘really’ part of China; while others (including PRC cartographers) would argue just as 
passionately that areas outside the borders marked on Western atlases – pre-eminently, Taiwan – 
definitely are part of China.  We would prefer to avoid these debates; yet, deciding what counts 
as ‘part of China’ would seem critical to deciding where its ‘diaspora’ begins.  Again our 
approach to this is practical rather than normative.  It is certainly relevant to discuss the role of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, without thereby characterising them as ‘diasporan’ communities, 
because they do form part of a disaporan chain –  having served as stepping stones for 
emigration further afield, and continuing to serve as important nodes in diasporan networks.  
Taiwan and Hong Kong are also major sources of commercial and philanthropic investment in 
the Chinese mainland.  On the other hand, in order to make our task more manageable in scope 
 
we will only in passing consider the Tibetan diaspora, although this is large, distinctive and in 
many cases deeply engaged in mobilising philanthropic and political support for Tibetan 
communities in the PRC. 
 
A third, generic issue is what we mean by ‘diaspora’, and how this relates to issues of identity.  
Although it has a very long history, the Chinese diaspora has little in common with the Jewish 
diaspora, which the word was originally coined to describe.  In some ways it appears to have 
more in common with emigration, whether political or economic, from European countries; yet 
the assimilation of European emigrants into host communities has generally been more rapid 
than the assimilation of Chinese emigrants.  Chinatowns around the world have at least partly 
preserved distinctly Chinese identities over several generations, and in places such as Southeast 
Asia many people of Chinese descent still appear, in some cases after hundreds of years, to 
constitute discrete ethnic and cultural communities; to the extent, at least, that they are 
vulnerable to attack in times of social stress, as was seen in Indonesia following the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s.  In short, whether because of the inherent strength of Chinese 
culture, or because of the lack of receptivity of host communities, Chinese emigrants in the past 
have not been quick to lose their Chineseness.  However, one important question is whether the 
pace of assimilation may now be growing, or set to grow rapidly. This perhaps applies especially 
to Europe and North America, where the plethora of available descriptors – ‘American Chinese’, 
‘Chinese American’, ‘American Born Chinese’ – itself implies shifting and contested views of 
the roles that ancestry and ethnicity play in the construction of personal identities. From almost 
every point of view, ancestry and ethnicity are undoubtedly less important factors in the lives of 
Americans of Chinese descent today than they were a hundred years ago. (This, naturally, is less 
clearly true of more recent migrants).  Will they in due course become as irrelevant as they are to 
contemporary English people, who generally neither know nor care whether they descend from 
Saxons, Celts, or ‘diasporan’ Normans, Danes, Huns etc.? (The Scots, Welsh and Irish care 
more!) 
 
A related issue is the extent to which ‘globalisation’ is changing the nature of international 
migration, and therefore of diasporas.  Increased international flows of capital are beginning to 
be matched by increased labour flows, but new migration patterns are emerging.  Despite 
political barriers, ‘economic migrants’ continue to flow towards opportunities in wealthier 
countries with low population growth matched by economic demand for low-wage labour in 
service industries.  But the restructuring of the global economy has also meant the relocation of 
labour-intensive industries to developing countries, and the growth of short-term migration on 
fixed labour contracts.  (China already routinely exports fixed-contract labour, and also uses 
semi-skilled Chinese labour in its own overseas aid projects, such as building dams in Africa.)   
It is probable, therefore, that well-educated and relatively affluent populations will figure 
prominently in future permanent migration from China to North America and Europe, increasing 
 
the global concentration of financial and intellectual capital.  Whilst this brain drain is in many 
ways a loss for the China, the émigrés will be relatively well positioned to give something back 
to the home country in a relatively short space of time. At the same time, we are witnessing the 
emergence of a highly mobile international business and professional elite, many of whose 
members have multiple citizenship and/or homes in several countries.  It is not clear whether the 
ethnic Chinese members of this elite can be properly regarded as part of the Chinese ‘disapora’; 




Between 1405 and 1433, the great Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng He led a fleet of 300 ships and 
28,000 men on seven expeditions into the seas beyond China.  The imperial fleet made stops in 
Java, Sumatra, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, sailing as far west as the Persian Gulf, Arabia, and 
East Africa, where today villagers off the coast of Kenya claim to be descendants of Zheng He's 
shipwrecked sailors.1  The state-of-the-art, nine-masted, 400-foot long ships might easily have 
made it to America – nearly a century before Christopher Columbus set off from Spain in his 
comparatively modest 85-foot long ships.   
 
But before Admiral Zheng could supplant Columbus’ place in history, reactionaries in the Ming 
Emperor's Court put an end to his travels, destroyed his records, dismantled his armada, and 
made it a capital offense to leave the country.  Chinese communities abroad, they feared, could 
nurture plots to overthrow the emperor.  The Middle Kingdom turned itself inward, falling into a 
long, bloated slumber just as Europe's own imperial aspirations began to rise.   
 
While the Ming Court was blind to the opportunity of a millennium, many of its subjects were 
not.  Zheng He’s travels and tales of civilizations beyond the Middle Kingdom fired the 
imaginations of merchants and artisans who, despite the imperial edicts forbidding foreign travel, 
sailed for southeast Asia, establishing the first Chinese settlements in the Philippines and 
Thailand. Although Chinese merchants had ventured beyond the empire before, the Chinese 
diaspora – now a global population of 34 million people of Chinese descent living in more than 
130 countries2 – was launched in earnest by Zheng He’s journeys.  In the Qing dynasty, the 
trickle of traders that followed in Zheng He’s wake grew into a flood swollen by peasants 
desperate to escape overpopulation  civil war, clan conflicts, and crop failures, especially in the 
southeastern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. They went to Southeast Asia, Africa and the 
Americas, where cheap labor to develop and exploit raw materials for Europe's colonial masters 
was in great demand.  More than two million people left China between 1848-1888.3  Chinese 
migrants to the Americas endured slave-like conditions as contract laborers in the guano fields of 
Peru, the sugar plantations of Cuba and Hawaii, and most famously, the gold mines and railroad 
camps of California.  Others who went to Southeast Asia flourished as shopkeepers, artisans, and 
 
plantation owners, amassing great fortunes as middlemen between local Southeast Asians and 
their European colonists.   
 
But the imperial ban on foreign travel remained in place.  The Chinese government ‘shall request 
foreign governments to have those Chinese who have been abroad repatriated so that they may 
be executed,’ declared a 1712 edict.4  While the edict was rarely enforced, things did not change 
until the mid-nineteenth century, when the Qing emperor, weakened significantly by conflicts the 
Western powers, signed agreements such as the Burlingame Treaty with the United States in 
1868 allowing Chinese to work abroad.  In 1893, a new imperial edict recognized the rights of all 
Chinese to travel abroad freely and declared that all Chinese emigrants would be allowed to 
return home whenever they wish.   
 
Chinese emigration continued to grow in the 20th century, as continuing social instability, war 
and revolution sent streams of Chinese out of the mainland.  The majority of them did not go far.  
Today, more than four out of five overseas Chinese – 24 million – live in Southeast Asia, most of 
them in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.5, where they control wealth and capital far out of 
proportion to their population.  Chinese in Indonesia, for instance, are just 2.5 percent of the total 
population, yet they control 73 percent of all wealth in the country.6  This concentration of 
wealth has caused deep resentment against the Chinese - and led to discriminatory laws and 
ethnic violence in their host countries. 
 
While the majority live in Southeast Asia, North America has become the destination of choice 
for modern émigrés.  Today, some 2.5 million Chinese live in the United States, where their 
numbers are growing faster than in any other region, and a million more live in Canada.7  
Beginning in the mid-20th century, a new class of educated, upper and middle Chinese began to 
arrive on America's shores.  This can be attributed in large part to America's Chinese 
immigration policies.  Educated Chinese emigres have long enjoyed special treatment by the 
United States.   Even as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 shut the door on poor Chinese 
laborers, Chinese students, many of whom had been sent by the Chinese government to master 
the advanced sciences and technologies of the West, continued to receive visas to study in the 
United States. Their numbers were such that by the 1930's most of the senior officials in Chiang 
Kai Shek's government had been educated in America.8   
 
The Chinese Exclusion Act was not repealed until 1943, when China and the United States 
became allies against Japan in World War II.  A new quota was created for Chinese immigrants 
(albeit one that was much lower than those for Europeans).  But students again received special 
treatment.   After the Communist revolution of 1949, the US Congress passed a law granting 
asylum to Chinese students studying in America, assuming that they had had ties to the defeated 
Guomindang.  This enabled about 5,000 Chinese to stay in America permanently.  Refugees 
 
from the Communist revolution were also given special permission to immigrate.  Some of 
today's most prominent Chinese-Americans are descended from this generation of elite 
immigrants - most of whom came from Shanghai:  entrepreneur Charles Wang, architect I.M. 
Pei, writer David Henry Hwang, composer Chou Wen-Chung.  
 
The Civil Rights movement in the United States forced the further reform and equalization of 
immigration laws, granting China the same immigration quotas as other countries:  20,000 
people.  Preference again was given to skilled professionals – leading to an immigration wave of 
Chinese students, doctors, engineers and scientists who are now comfortably integrated into 
America's upper middle classes.  While Communist China remained closed off to the world from 
1949-1979, most of the 20,000 slots were taken by Chinese immigrating from Taiwan.  But with 
the recognition of the People's Republic in 1979, another 20,000 slots were created for 
immigrants from the mainland.  Today, along with a new quota of 5,000 Hong Kong Chinese, 
some 45,000 Chinese legally immigrate to the U.S. every year.   The actual numbers are larger 
since many people of Chinese descent enter the U.S. through quotas dedicated to Southeast 
Asian countries. 
 
Chinese immigration to the United States saw its largest spike in 1989, when, in the wake of the 
Chinese government crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square, some 80,000 Chinese 
students studying in America were granted green cards under the Chinese Student Protection 
Act.  Another ten thousand Chinese enter the United States as students each year. 9  Many of 
them will not return to China until they have obtained green cards or U.S. citizenship.  Of 
580,000 mainland Chinese who have studied abroad since 1978, only around a quarter have 
returned home.10  The numbers applying for student visas are likely to grow as China’s business 
and professional elites grow richer and stronger, since many parents are keen, and able to afford, 
to send their children overseas for high school and university education, or at least to learn 
English.  
 
Meanwhile, the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 prompted many of Hong 
Kong’s better-off residents to apply for nationality elsewhere, buying property or investing in 
other countries to advance their claims to citizenship, as an ‘insurance policy’ against heavy 
handed intervention by the mainland in Hong Kong’s way of life.    
 
But if the general trend of immigration and access to developed countries appears increasingly to 
favour more highly skilled, educated and affluent people, it is also the case that many thousands 
of peasants each year risk their lives to be smuggled into Europe and the United States. Recent 
field research by Frank Pieke and others indeed suggests that the last twenty years have seen an 
‘energisation’ of emigration from China, providing an ‘infusion of new blood into existing 
communities of overseas Chinese’ where there is new demand for cheap labour in Chinese 
 
owned businesses, to replace established and now upwardly mobile immigrants.11  Moreover, 
Pieke found that many of the new, illegal immigrants are coming from areas with little or no 
previous history of emigration (such as western Fujian, as opposed to the traditional labour 
supply areas in the south of the province), and that international migration patterns are 
increasingly interwoven with migration within China: the departing Fujianese are being replaced 
by less well-off peasants from the interior provinces.  Given the dynamism and sophistication of 
migrant networks, and the difficulties that Western governments typically experience in 
controlling the flow, it is likely that Chinese communities in Europe and North America will 
continue to be enriched by this infusion of new and hardworking blood. 
  
The diaspora must  therefore be seen as complex and multi-faceted.  It includes established 
communities with second, third, even fourth and fifth generations: some of these are figuratively 
as well as literally remote from their ancestral home (as in Africa and Latin America), but others 
(as in Singapore and elsewhere in Asia) have retained or renewed ties with the mainland.  It 
includes people who left China as refugees from communism, and a newer wave of – often 
entrepreneurial and well educated – émigrés who have left over the last twenty years.  It includes 
people who are perhaps not ‘disaporan’ so much as Chinese members of a global transnational 
class; and it also includes new migrants of more modest means who continue to make their way 
overseas illegally.  
 
Managing the overseas Chinese constituency  
 
From wanting to bring back and execute its émigrés, the Chinese state (and aspirants to 
government) shifted in the late imperial and republican period to wanting to recruit them as allies 
in reconstruction, modernisation and nation building.  In the late 19th century, influential scholar-
officials such as Liang Qichao (1873-1929) enjoyed some success in persuading the Qing court 
that overseas Chinese, especially in the flourishing communities of Southeast Asia, should be 
actively encouraged to return. Their capital and technical skills, he argued, would be important 
assets in modernising China and defending it from Japanese expansionism.12  Similar concerns 
echoed through much of the following, turbulent century – although the turbulence in fact 
increased, rather than reversed, the outward flow. 
 
While himself favouring constitutional monarchy, Liang nonetheless helped prepare the ground 
for republicanism by articulating, in writings that were read widely by overseas Chinese, new 
concepts of gongmin and guomin. Both terms can be loosely translated as ‘citizen’, implying 
political rights as well as responsibilities, but emphasising, respectively, membership of a public 
realm and membership of a nation.13 If today these seem rather anodyne ideas, at the time they 
signalled seismic change in a political culture that had for thousands of years attached supreme 
importance to continuity and social hierarchy rooted in the Confucian virtues of filial piety and 
 
loyalty to the ruler. A concept of nationhood based on common historical identity rather than on 
allegiance to the emperor made possible a new kind of patriotism in which overseas Chinese 
could participate.  
 
China’s first republican president, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), took these ideas further in the Three 
Principles of the People (san min zhuyi) on which he hoped to found a new China: ‘Nationalism’ 
(minzu zhuyi)  ‘Democracy’ (minchuan zhuyi) and ‘People’ Livelihood’ (minsheng zhuyi).14  Sun 
came from a relatively poor rural Guangdong family that had sent kin overseas: two of his uncles 
died as ‘contract coolies’ (huagong) in the 1849 California gold rush.15 From the age of 13, Sun 
himself was educated in Hawaii and Hong Kong. Before his brief stint as president in 1912, he 
spent sixteen years in exile in Japan, South East Asia, North America and Europe, raising money 
from Chinese communities worldwide to support a series of abortive military actions. Overseas 
Chinese also returned to fight and die in these insurrections, as in the Canton (Guangdong) 
uprising of April, 1911, which is still commemorated in Huanhuaguang by a mausoleum – built 
with donations from overseas Chinese – to ‘72 martyrs’, most of them from Chinese 
communities abroad. The birth of the republic was thus intimately connected – financially, 
politically, and in terms of the interchange of ideas – with these overseas communities. 
 
Republicanism entailed a new construction of Chinese nationality, to confer (or, as some would 
argue, to impose) a common identity upon an ethnically diverse empire.  The flag of the first 
republic comprised five stripes representing five ethnic groups then deemed to belong to the 
Chinese nation – Han, Muslim, Mongol, Manchu and Tibetan.16  In an elaboration of this theme, 
the present People’s Republic embraces 56 officially recognised ethnic groups, although even 
this larger number significantly understates the diversity of the ‘Han’ majority, which includes 
many people with mutually unintelligible spoken languages (rather like grouping Italian and 
Spanish people together as ‘Latins’).  However, the overarching concept of huaren  (‘Chinese 
people’), although reflected in the current Republic’s full title (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo), 
is strongly associated with the cradle of Chinese civilisation along the Yellow River17, and thus 
with those of Han ethnicity.18  Curiously, therefore, the notion of huaren extends more naturally 
to Han people abroad  – who are referred to in China as huaqiao (‘Chinese sojourners’) or, in the 
case of their descendants, as huayi  (‘of Chinese descent’) – than it does to some ethnic minority 
citizens of the People’s Republic. Tibetans and Uighurs, for example, would not normally count 
themselves as huaren. 
 
The post-imperial Chinese state can therefore be said to have a strong sense of its core émigrés 
still belonging in some sense to China, and comprising an important constituency. The other side 
of this coin is a strong sense of the ‘otherness’ of foreign nationalities and cultures, reflected in 
extremely restrictive policies for immigration into China, even for foreign spouses of nationals. 
 
Naturalisation is limited by the 1980 Nationality Law to descendants of ethnic Chinese, and each 
year only 70-80 non ethnic Chinese obtain Chinese citizenship.19 
 
As the new republic descended into warlordism, Japanese incursion and invasion, and civil war, 
courting of the overseas Chinese constituency became divided along ideological lines. Both the 
Nationalist and Communist parties sought financial and political support from the diaspora. In 
1937, Sun Yat-sen’s widow, Soong Ching Ling, who sided with the Communists, established a 
China Defense League that took medical supplies and established ‘international peace hospitals’ 
behind Chinese lines (then allied in a fragile ‘united front’ of Nationalists and Communists), 
especially serving Mao Zedong’s 8th Route Army and 4th New Army.20  The League also set up 
schools and child care centres such as the ‘Los Angeles Nursery’, supported by the Los Angeles 
Chinese community, in a loess plateau cave in Mao’s Yan’an ‘revolutionary base area’. Such 
was Soong’s prestige among Chinese overseas that she was able to elicit substantial donations 
for the League from prominent Chinese tycoons in the British colony of Hong Kong and further 
afield.   
 
After the Communist victory in 1949 Soong presided over a China Welfare Fund that established 
‘children’s palaces’ kindergartens and hospitals Shanghai and Beijing.  The Fund became 
moribund during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76); but in 1986, five years after Soong’s death, 
a new foundation was established in her name. As well as promoting ‘Soong Ching Ling 
thought’ and managing museums dedicated to her life and work, the Soong Ching Ling 
Foundation today awards prizes for children’s literature and raises funds for school building and 
scholarship programmes, notably in predominantly Muslim Ningxia Province where it has raised 
CNY 10 million (USD 1.2 million) to support the education of girl children. It has also 
conducted nationwide anti-smoking campaigns in schools. Branches in Shanghai and Chongqing 
municipalities and in the provinces of Hainan, Shaanxi and Henan  have their own child welfare 
programmes.  These are partly funded by donations from Chinese communities overseas, through 
affiliated branches in Canada, Hungary and Japan.   
 
In 1949 the Communist party-state set up an ‘All-China Federation of Returned Overseas 
Chinese’ (Qiaolian).  This was one of eight, Leninist ‘organisations of the masses’, created to 
oversee different constituencies: most notably, women (the All-China Women’s Federation); 
youth (the Youth League); workers (the All-China Federation of Trade Unions), but also 
scientists, writers, artists and cultural workers.  These did not serve to represent their 
constituencies so much as to disseminate the Party line among them and strengthen ‘democratic 
centralist’ political control.  Although the mass organisations broadly retain this political 
function they have, over the last twenty years, shifted towards more of a social welfare and 
service provider role, as state, workplace-based and rural cooperative welfare provision has been 
rolled back.  The Youth League, for example, established a China Youth Development 
 
Foundation whose flagship ‘Project Hope’ has been highly successful in raising funds for school 
building and basic education scholarship programmes; and Youth League cadre training 
programmes now emphasise youth and community work as well as political education.  The 
Women’s Federation established, in 1981, a China Children and Teenager’s Fund whose ‘Spring 
Bud’ programme supports basic education for girl children, vocational education for teenagers 
and, more recently, health programmes; and in many areas training for women cadres now also 
embraces social as well as political dimensions.  The Returned Overseas Chinese Federation has 
evolved in a similar way, but also with a strong emphasis on promoting economic and 
commercial ties with the overseas constituency. 
 
As originally conceived, the Federation was intended to oversee and help reintegrate ‘returned 
overseas Chinese’ who came back to play a role in national reconstruction. In the event, the 
number of returnees was far exceeded by the number who fled the revolution, and then the 
Cultural Revolution, for Taiwan, Hong Kong and elsewhere.  Nonetheless, several hundreds of 
thousands of the overseas Chinese did return throw in their fortunes with the People’s Republic, 
and many of these were settled on more than 80 large farms that are still managed by the 
Federation.21 
 
Over the last twenty years, however, the national Federation and its sub-national branches22 have 
been more concerned not with those who have returned but in developing relationships with 
those who remain overseas.  One aspect of this is promoting ‘cultural exchange’ and mainland 
tourism for overseas Chinese.  (The national level Federation owns a large, luxury hotel on a 
prime site in downtown Beijing; and local branches also commonly own hotels).  More central to 
the Federation’s work appears to be an economic department that helps potential investors 
identify investment opportunities.  Finally, the Federation has a social welfare department with a 
subsidiary registered in 1998, the Overseas Chinese Economic and Cultural Foundation of China, 
which raises money for public benefit cultural and educational programmes.  Over the last three 
years, the Foundation has raised a total of CNY 500 million (USD 60.5 million), which has been 
spent on building 596 schools (for which local governments are required to provide 60% match 
funding), and providing scholarships for outstanding students from poor provinces in Western 
China to attend Beijing University.  The funding has come from Chinese individuals (about 300 
principal donors each year) and communities in Hong Kong, Macao – notwithstanding the return 
of the colonies to Chinese sovereignty, Federation officials still appear, at least for the present, to 
count their citizens as ‘huaqiao’ –  South East Asia and Europe. Only a relatively small 
proportion of the donated funds originate from North America.  Apart from these efforts by the 
national organisation, branches in 23 provinces are encouraged to participate in a Qiaoxin 
Gongcheng  (‘Overseas Heart Project’) that sets a nominal ‘100-1,000-10,000’ target: each 
province is encouraged to find donors to build 100 schools, support 1,000 additional projects 
(such as equipping libraries and computer rooms), and provide 10,000 scholarships.23  
 
The main government body for mediating relationships with Chinese communities overseas and 
developing relevant policy is the Department for Overseas Chinese Affairs (Qiaoban), under the 
direct jurisdiction of the State Council (roughly, China’s equivalent of a Cabinet).  In common 
with other government departments, this has provincial and county level counterparts that both 
report upwards to the central Department and coordinate with other local government agencies.24  
It also places staff in Chinese embassies abroad to liaise with local Chinese communities.  
 
Over the last twenty years the Qiaoban and other government bodies have been increasingly 
active in sending delegations to visit Chinese communities abroad, and in hosting return visits. 
According to Hungarian scholar, Pál Nyíri, in 1991 a total of 381 delegations comprising 2,093 
individuals were sent overseas from Guangdong Province alone, and by 1995 this had risen to 
526 delegations involving 21,966 people. 25  The Federation of Chinese Associations in Rome 
told Nyíri they had received more than 270 official Chinese delegations in 1995.  (These very 
high figures have to be seen in light of the fact that it is hard for Chinese people to travel 
overseas as private tourists: trade delegations are a highly desirable junket for officials, and 
sightseeing is usually a major part of the agenda.)  Qiaoban offices in Fujian Province received 
over 500 delegations in 1998, while their counterparts in Guangdong received more than 3,000, 
involving no less than 270,514 visitors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and further afield.26  
(Again, these visits clearly contain an element of tourism, and prominently feature sightseeing 
tours and visits to ancestral homes.)  
 
At the same time, Nyíri notes, there has been an explosion in the number of publications aimed 
at overseas Chinese communities and produced by official mainland agencies. Guangdong and 
and Fujian authorities together publish over 190 such magazines, newspapers and periodicals, 
with a total overseas circulation topping two million, mostly distributed free.27   Over the last few 
years mainstream Chinese media have also become internationalised through websites and 
satellite broadcasting, enabling them to reach the overseas constituency.  
 
This drive to reach out to Chinese communities abroad appears largely calculated to secure their 
investment in China, and in this respect it has been highly successful. According to one official 
source, as much as 70% of China’s foreign direct investment, a major motor of economic growth 
over the last two decades, has come from overseas Chinese.28  (In this context, the ‘overseas 
Chinese’ rubric includes Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose transfer of labour intensive industries to 
Special Economic Zones in the mainland during the 1980s was a defining feature of Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reform period.) A raft of policy documents and regulations have provided, 
or instructed local government agencies to provide, preferential terms to overseas Chinese 
investors.  The October 1986 Regulations on Promoting Foreign Investment laid out general 
principles for tax breaks, access to land for establishing factories, and employment of local 
 
labour.  In 1988, Regulations for Encouraging Investment by Compatriots from Taiwan 
encouraged local authorities to cooperate with Taiwanese investors in Hainan, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Zhejiang and other coastal areas (Articles 2, 3).  The 1990 Law on the Protection of 
the Rights and Interests of Returned Overseas and Relatives of Overseas Chinese formally 
guaranteed the property rights of this constituency (Article 10), including inheritance rights 
(Article 13) and the right to receive remittances from overseas (Article 12), and ordered local 
governments to support their efforts to establish commercial, industrial or agricultural ventures  
(Article 9).  By embracing the ‘relatives of overseas Chinese’, not just the relatives of returnees, 
the law facilitates investment, through kin, of people who have not themselves returned.  Further 
Regulations on Encouraging Investment by Overseas Chinese and Compatriots from Hong Kong 
and Macao, issued by the State Council in May 2001, seek to promote investment in real estate 
development and hi-tech industries. 
 
Although current government plans to develop China’s Western provinces include urging 
overseas Chinese investors to relocate labour intensive industries from coastal to inland areas, it 
is the hi-tech sector that now most exercises the official imagination.  Where the 1980s and early 
90s were marked by the development of coastal export processing zones for electronics, toy, 
garments and footwear industries, the new emphasis is on research and development in areas 
such as information technology, biotechnology, new materials technology, energy efficiency and 
environmental protection.  To this end, a number of ‘science and technology parks’ have been 
established in the most economically developed provinces, with highly preferential investment 
terms designed to attract Western-trained ‘overseas Chinese scholars’.   The local government of 
Suzhou New District (in Zhejiang Province) has been investing 3% of its annual revenue in 
establishing one such a facility, where ‘overseas Chinese scholars’ with registered capital of no 
more than USD 10,000 can enjoy rent-free office space for a first year, followed by rental for an 
unspecified period at 50% of the market price (or an option to buy at 80% of the market price); 
the start-up companies enjoy a three year tax holiday, followed by a 50% tax rebate for two years 
and a 20%  rebate for a further year.29 An ‘Incubator Park for Returned Scholars’ in Shanghai 
similarly offers ‘eight supporting treatments’, including the use of a 10,000 m3 workshop for two 
years rent-free or for sale at a ‘preferential’ price, 50% tax rebates, low interest loans from a 
development fund, and an undertaking that the park will cover all costs ‘including transport, 
communication, accommodation and meals . . . [during] . . . the process of project negotiation’.30 
Beijing has established similar facilities and, according to Vice Mayor Yang Anjiang, aims to 
attract ‘6,000 or more returned scholars’.31  To woo them back, numerous conferences, 
conventions and fairs are held: 2,000 graduates of overseas universities attended one recent such 
event, in Guangzhou in December 2002.32  The Ministry for Education, meanwhile, has 
instructed regional educational authorities to make special provision for the children of ‘returned 
scholars’, including extra language coaching for those who have been schooled in English.33 
 
(This contrasts sharply with attitudes to the children of China’s internal migrant labourers, who 
face considerable formal and informal barriers to state education in host communities.) 
 
Alongside the efforts to bring back foreign trained scientists, technicians and business managers 
to stimulate new industuries (with MBA degrees now much in demand), some government 
departments are also increasingly keen to recruit returned graduates from overseas (haiguipai) 
into public administration.  In 2002, the government of Liaoning made 42 such appointments, 
and reportedly received 120 applications from appropriately qualified haiguipai.34   In some 
sectors, however, there has been more official caution.   During the 1990s, the Ford Foundation 
supported a number of new social science research centres in Chinese universities, in the hope of 
bringing back overseas trained social scientists to play a role in empirical research and public 
policy formulation.  However, according to the Ford Program Officer responsible, although some 
of the centers flourished, ‘officials [were] too suspicious of internationally trained Chinese 
scholars to permit much participation’35  
 
The objects of this intense courtship are evidently not the long-established Chinese communities 
overseas so much as the new ‘scholar’ migrants who go to study, and often contrive to remain, 
abroad.  If the available inducements indicate a sustained effort to reverse this brain drain, it is 
also notable that returnees are not required to make a permanent commitment to remain in China.      
Article 17 of the 1990 Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Returned Overseas 
and Relatives of Overseas Chinese states that “Returned overseas Chinese and relatives of 
overseas Chinese shall have the right to leave the country and settle down abroad”, and Article 
13 permits them to own property abroad.   This strongly suggests that although the mainland 
does not formally recognise dual nationality, the state is nonetheless accommodating itself to 
globalisation by allowing its intellectual elite to become transnational.   Further evidence of this 
trend is provided by Shanghai municipality’s decision to start providing its own permanent 
residence permit ‘green cards’ to Chinese foreign nationals – many of them US green card 
holders.36  
 
However, significant emphasis is still placed on loyalty to China, if not to communist ideology. 
According to Pál Nyíri, the national and local Qiaoban and other government departments have 
worked actively, and with a significant degree of success, to encourage Chinese abroad to form 
new professional, kinship and common-place organisations, and Chinese government agencies 
have even provided funding for such groups to hold conventions. 37   The existence of these 
intermediary organisations facilitates liaison with the Chinese community overseas in ways that 
are mutually beneficial.  Nyíri notes that many of the organisations’ leaders manage to meet and 
have photographs taken with senior Chinese leaders, and that these pictures and newspaper 
cuttings ‘are assets of considerable importance when doing business or dealing with officials 
back in China.’  In return for this patronage, the organisations show patriotic allegiance to the 
 
mainland on issues that are important to the Communist Party.  Many, for example, organised 
protests at the 1998 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; and the People’s Daily 
English website includes dozens of stories about overseas Chinese organisations worldwide 
denouncing the quasi-Buddhist Falun Gong sect, against which the mainland government 
launched a campaign in 1999.  Even more importantly, the overseas organisations are 
encouraged to endorse the ‘one China policy’ of reunification with Taiwan. 
 
Thus, in Nyíri’s view, current Chinese nationalism is quite consistent with the transnationalism 
of its business and intellectual elite, drawing on  
 
 . . . a triumphalist, unificatory and mobilising myth of Chineseness as an eternal cultural 
condition inherited with blood and, regardless of citizenship, carrying ‘Chinese values’ 
such as love for the family, subordination of the individual to the collective interests, 
diligence, and frugality, and thus resulting in superior business results.  
 
On this view, the Chinese abroad are seen not as a loss to the nation but, on the contrary, as a 
means of strengthening the nation in a globalised world.  In further support of this view, Nyíri 
cites an article by an anonymous ‘Shanghai New Migrants Research Project Team’ that, he 
believes, was clearly written ‘on instructions from the Qiaoban and the Public Security Bureau’.  
It states that: 
 
Since reform and opening, people who have left mainland China to reside abroad (called 
‘new migrants’ for short) have continuously been more numerous. They are currently 
rising as an important force within overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese communities.  In 
the future, they will become a backbone of forces friendly to us in America and some 
other developed Western countries.38  
 
Despite numerous requests, it was not possible for the authors of this paper to obtain an 
interview with the Qiaoban, and we are in no position to judge whether senior policymakers are 
as sanguine about the ‘new migrants’ as Nyíri’s analysis suggests. The intensive efforts to attract 
back Chinese who study overseas, frequently reported by the Chinese press, indicate more 
concern than complacency.  Yet in many fields Chinese policy making is not unified or 
consistent, despite the appearance of monolithic government, but tends to flow in several 
directions at once in the effort to reconcile competing interests.39  Policy towards the diaspora 
appears to involve both new and old elements.   
 
For example, two universities founded by the Qiaoban in the early years of communist rule and 
intended to attract students from overseas Chinese communities are still in business.  The 
National Overseas Chinese University was established in 1960 under the patronage of then 
 
Premier Zhou Enlai. Appropriately enough, the university is located in a famous Qiaoxiang 
(overseas Chinese county): Quanzhou, Fujian, the ancestral home of millions of overseas 
Chinese.  It is overseen by a board of directors consisting of prominent foreigners of Chinese 
origin, Hong Kong and Macao citizens, and returned overseas Chinese, and maintains 
representative offices in both Hong Kong and Macao.  Since its founding, the university has 
educated some 60,000 students, 32,000 of whom came from outside the mainland.  Today, 
16,000 students are currently enrolled in degree programs, 1,600 of whom are from countries 
such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Korea, and the United States.  While overseas 
Chinese comprise just 10 percent of students today, educating overseas Chinese – or at least 
paying lip service to the idea – remains central to the University's mission.  The People's Daily 
dedicated a full story on its website to the fact that ‘Huaqiao University Confers Master's Degree 
on 30 Macao Students in 2002.’ 40 And as the University's own website proclaimed, today's 
Overseas Chinese University continues its aim of ‘serving overseas Chinese, facing overseas, 
and facing Hong Kong and Macao.’  The University has also set up a new campus near Xiamen, 
to train overseas Chinese and foreigners in the Chinese language.  
 
Older, and more renowned, is Guangzhou’s Jinan University.  Founded in 1906, and re-
established in 1958, this was China's first university designated for overseas Chinese.  A College 
of Chinese Language and Culture was established to educate this student body.  Today, about 
one-third of students at Jinan, which advertises itself on its website as ‘Best University for 
Overseas Chinese Students’, come from beyond the Chinese mainland, mainly Hong Kong and 
Macao.  News reports in recent years have focused on the fact that Jinan has begun to draw more 
and more Hong Kong students – especially those who either cannot get places in Hong Kong 
Universities or are hoping to pursue career opportunities on the mainland.  Lower tuition fees are 
also a significant lure.41 
 
These institutions no doubt act primarily in pursuit of their own institutional and commercial 
interests.  Yet the universities’ ability to attract students from Chinese communities overseas, 
and the strong demand, among people of Chinese descent raised abroad, for Chinese language 
training (which a host of mainland schools now compete to provide), both suggest the enduring 
strength of the connection to the mainland that many ‘diasporan’ people feel.  It is hardly 
surprising that the Chinese government and Communist Party should actively to seek to confirm 
and strengthen this sense of connection – whether by encouraging people back, or by 
encouraging them to remain loyal to China’s national interest while ‘sojourning’ elsewhere, or 
both. For it would naturally suit Beijing very well if the Chinese diaspora were not a global 
scattering, but a cohesive community of globalised Chinese people, able to mobilise financial, 




From remittance to endowment: traditions of diaspora philanthropy  
 
Whether they were laundrymen subsisting on modest wages in America or wealthy Southeast 
Asian merchants, Chinese emigrants never forgot their obligations to the family members and 
home villages they left behind. 
 
Between 1929 - 1940, remittances to China averaged $80 - $100 million a year, enough money 
to offset China's balance of payments deficit each year, and prop up entire provincial 
economies.42   The impact of such streams of cash can be easily seen in one county in 
Guangdong province, Taishan.  For centuries, Taishanese had struggled to coax crops from the 
region's rocky, hilly alkaline soil, rarely raising enough to keep stomachs full. In the winter, the 
men would travel to the nearby port of Guangzhou in search of work to supplement their meager 
incomes.  It was only a matter of time before the Taishanese moved even further afield – to pan 
for gold in the mountains of California. 
 
By 1900, one in four Taishanese had lived abroad, the vast majority of them in the United States.  
In one district, 600 of the male population of 1,000 worked abroad.  In the 1920's and 30's, one 
eighth of all remittances to China were sent to Taishan families.43 
 
As a result, by the early 20th century, the once dirt-poor county became home to countless new 
ostentatious two-story homes, called yang lou (foreign houses), that came complete with Western 
touches such as stained glass windows and greek columns.  New  banks, doctors' offices and 
clothing shops sprung up to cater to the county's new rich.  Taishan emigres also brought home 
the latest technologies from abroad – electrical streetlights, telephone systems, and a movie 
theater.  One prosperous Taishanese-American also attempted to build a railroad connecting 
Taishan to Guangzhou, a project that ultimately failed. 
 
But while charity always began at home, overseas Chinese were also generous to the wider 
community. Between 1910 and 1949, money raised from Taishanese abroad  helped build at least 
86 new elementary schools and nine middle schools in Taishan.  Funds were also raised to build 
libraries, teachers colleges and to renovate existing schools.  As a result, 75 percent of all 
children, male and female attended school in Taishan.  The Taishan education budget exceeded 
those of all its neighboring counties and trailed only the metropolis of Guangzhou in numbers of 
schools and teachers.44 
 
Counties built by overseas Chinese money – called Qiaoxiang --  can be found all across 
Guangdong, whose émigrés traveled to the United States; and neighboring Fujian province, 
whose émigrés landed, for the most part, in Taiwan or Southeast Asia. 
 
 
One of the most generous –  and revered – overseas Chinese philanthropists of the 20th century, 
was Chen Jiageng (Tan Kah Kee), a native of Fujian province who migrated to Singapore at the 
turn of the 20th century and built an empire of rubber manufacturing, import/export, and rice 
trading that earned him a reputation as ‘the Henry Ford of Malaya.’  Beginning from the age of 
20, when he funded a school in his home village of Jimei, not far from the port city of Xiamen, 
Chen would dedicate a staggering $100 million USD – half his entire fortune – to education 
projects in China.  ‘Without progress in education,’ Chen said, ‘There will be no flourishing 
industry but degradation of people's livelihood.’  In 1913, he founded the Jimei Primary School 
on the banks of the Xinglin Bay.  The school, which was run by Mr. Chen's brother, was known 
for its superior academics, drawing students from throughout the region.  The school grew into a 
large educational complex with an elementary and high school, a college, and a vocational 
training center.   Today, it is a fully-fledged university, offering degrees in engineering, teaching 
and business administration to about 12,000 students.  Another 110 schools in 20 counties 
benefited from his largesse.  In 1921, Chen also endowed Xiamen University, which remains one 
of China's top universities today.    
 
Though officially a British subject, Chen was fiercely loyal to China.  He was a generous 
supporter of Sun Yat-Sen's revolutionary activities in the 1920s.  During World War II, as 
chairman of the Southeast Overseas Chinese General Association, he raised millions for China's 
war effort.  He became an ardent supporter of the Communists and on September 21st 1949 led a 
15 member delegation of overseas Chinese to join a historic meeting of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, at which the All China Returned Overseas Chinese Federation 
was founded. He was appointed to serve as its first Chairman. When he died in 1961, he 
bequeathed his remaining fortune to the nation. 
 
One of the relatively few writers to have considered the topic of overseas (and especially 
American) Chinese philanthropy is John Deeney.45  He locates Chinese philanthropy in a long 
tradition of reciprocity and giving that draws on the Confucian ideal of benevolence (ren), 
reinforced by Buddhism and Taoist teachings.46  These engendered what Robert Lee, quoted by 
Deeney, describes as ‘the idea of corporate personality, not an isolated, insular self, but rather an 
ethos of interdependence.’47  As a result, according to Stella Shao (also quoted by Deeney):  
 
. . . philanthropy as such is not considered a separate and categorical concept.  Asians 
give because of their understanding that benevolence, compassion, interdependence and 
basic respect for humankind are necessary ingredients to living, first in their families, 
then in their own ethnic communities, then in the greater society.48 
 
Against this background, Deeney describes Chinese giving as essentially private, personal and 
informal (as opposed to public and professional), starting with family and gradually extending to 
 
‘institutions that support the family spirit – such as schools and churches or temples’.  This 
certainly seems to be borne out in a preliminary overview of traditions of Chinese diaspora 
giving, with its progression from remitting money to relatives to social investment in 
communities of origin, with a special emphasis on education.   
 
This almost invariable emphasis on education is an entirely natural extension of China’s 
extremely long history of respect for scholarship.  The imperial bureaucracy was always a 
meritocracy of a kind, with positions of power, including the power to accumulate wealth, 
distributed in accordance with candidates’ performance in civil service examinations.  The belief 
that education was the way to get ahead was thus written through Chinese culture many centuries 
before the European Enlightenment.  Understandably enough, the preoccupation remains today: 
‘education changes fate’ (jiaoyu gaibian minglu) was the slogan selected by famed film director, 
Zhang Yimou, for a series of Central China Television advertisements encouraging the public to 
donate for school building programmes in the poor Western provinces.  And, as can be seen from 
the discussion in the preceding section, this preoccupation is today also thoroughly socialised. 
Advanced education, notably in science and technology, is seen as a major pre-requisite for 
building a powerful and prosperous nation: hence the fuss over the ‘returned scholars’ – not to 
mention an ambitious, ongoing programme to rapidly treble the proportion of young Chinese 
entering tertiary education at home.  Private giving for educational causes may thus be seen both 
as a way to provide individuals with otherwise inaccessible opportunities, and as a way of 
helping to build the nation.  
 
Deeney also notes, as a feature of the personal and informal nature of Chinese philanthropy, that:  
 
Ties of friendship and respect are all-important; once they have been established, then 
personal trust counts more than anything else.  Hence, many generous Chinese prefer that 
solicitations be made through family members or close friends rather than through 
impersonal direct mailings.  They also generally eschew formal applications, detailed 
reports, and accounting details as tedious, unnecessarily complex, and time-consuming, 
and much prefer a more informal approach.  Unless there is a major donation involved, 
once the gift is given there is little, if any, follow-up expected or required. 
 
As an example of personal and private giving, Deeney mentions a group of American Chinese 
doctors and dentists in Pittsburgh who travel regularly to China, without doing so under the 
auspices of any formal organisation, to give hands-on training to Chinese counterparts.   Many 
individuals from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South East Asia engage in similar activities.49 
 
However, when it comes to donating money rather than time, this personal and informal 
approach is in a sense problematic.  It is a common theme of writing on many aspects of China 
 
that personal relationships and connections (guanxi) can carry more weight than formal, 
institutional, contractual or legal relationships.  This is, for example, cited as a significant 
obstacle to the establishment of anything like the ‘rule of law’ in a Western sense.50  Too often, 
Western critics of China simply confuse or conflate guanxi with corruption, without recognising 
the complex traditions of reciprocity in which is based: but it is a form of social capital that 
people more or less consciously accumulate and draw upon. 51  It is this process that Deeney is 
describing when he identifies 
 
. . . a preference for appeals that are made by a friend, an acquaintance at work, or a 
family member – especially if these people occupy leadership positions and will invite 
one into their circle of wealthy and influential colleagues. This approach is also partly 
due to the common practice among Chinese Americans of donating to the chosen causes 
of friends who gave to one’s own favourite causes – another example of the obligation of 
reciprocal giving. 
 
Giving to charitable causes may thus be a means of accumulating guanxi, and one’s own guanxi 
may be mobilised in encouraging others to give. This is problematic not because it raises 
questions (which we decline to examine) about the authenticity of motives, but because it 
naturally disadvantages causes that have few contacts with or advocates among elites. Some of 
China’s more independent, citizen-initiated non profit organisations have by chance happened to 
make personal connections with overseas Chinese donors, but these seem to be the exception 
rather than the rule.52  We also consider, below, examples of overseas organisations that pursue 
philanthropy actively, establishing their own projects – largely through personal networks – 
rather than passively contributing to mainland managed operations   But on the whole the 
overseas Chinese philanthropic market is dominated by Chinese government agencies (or 
government sponsored agencies) that can afford to make personal contact with groups overseas, 
or that are represented by government officials and through the Qiaoban.   
 
Cementing relationships with government officials undoubtedly plays a significant role in giving 
to or through these agencies. Again, this raises questions of efficacy as much as motivation. 
Chinese government involvement in relief and charitable provision, and the attempts to recruit 
support from elites, is by no means new: because of the Confucian presumption of state virtue, 
imperial scholar officials were expected to play a leading role in such efforts, and bureaucrats in 
post-Mao China have resumed this role.53  But government dominance and direction of China’s 
gradually emerging ‘third sector’, which in many ways recalls the centralised control of the 
command economy, may not be the best way of enabling it to play a creative and constructive 
role in social provision and in ‘correcting market failures’. Furthermore, of particular concern is 
the almost complete lack of transparency in government mobilised philanthropy.  It is extremely 
 
hard to determine whether the donor trust, that Deeney describes as typical, is justified; this is of 
course exacerbated by the lack of expectation for reporting and follow-up.  
 
Present patterns of diaspora giving 
 
The official non profit sector 
 
As previously noted, China’s ‘mass organisations’ have over the last twenty years shifted 
significantly (although by no means yet entirely) towards a social service provider role.  Over the 
same period, a number of new, state sponsored charitable foundations have been established.  
These together comprise an official non profit sector that is a manifestation of government desire 
to recruit ‘social forces’ in social service funding and provision, reflecting global trends towards 
a reduced role for government. 
 
In addition to this official non profit sector, the last twenty years have, with the increase in 
personal freedoms in China, seen the establishment of registered membership organisations 
including many small scale, private charitable initiatives.54  The legal environment for these is, 
however, extremely restrictive, reflecting government concerns about ‘social forces’ that it 
cannot control. All registered organisations must be sponsored and supervised by a ‘relevant’ 
government department or Communist Party agency.  It must have office premises, and start-up 
funds; and only one organisation of each ‘type’ (eg, one environment protection group, one self-
help group for parents of autistic children) may register at each administrative level.  These 
provisions narrowly limit the autonomy of legal organisations, and militate against the formation 
of genuinely ‘grass roots’ community or advocacy groups.   Nonetheless, over the last few years 
a number of more independent and NGO-like groups have formed, often with international 
support, in sectors such as environment protection, women’ rights, HIV/AIDS prevention, and 
disability.55 Their strategies for negotiating the restrictive legal environment include registering 
as businesses or ‘research centers’, attaching themselves to academic institutions, or simply 
ignoring the rules and relying on local goodwill and networks of strategic alliances to fend off 
official clampdowns.  Such groups have shown potential, creativity and courage in developing 
new forms of service provision and advocacy, but their prospects for growth are severely 
constrained by the uncertain legal environment. 
 
We began this study with the firm expectation that the official non profit sector would be a major 
beneficiary of overseas Chinese philanthropy.  In fact this turns out to be much less the case than 
we had supposed.  Although open to donations from any sources, the official non profit 
organisations have not, in the main, systematically targeted overseas Chinese donors; nor, 
typically, do they even maintain break-downs of their funding sources – which suggests that their 
fundraising operations, despite experimentation with techniques such as on-line giving and 
 
soliciting funds through cellphone short text messages, is not yet particularly strategic or 
professionalised.  However, nearly every charity and non profit organisation that we interviewed 
told us that giving from ‘overseas Chinese’ based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia far 
outstrips giving from North American Chinese. 
 
The China Youth Development Foundation’s ‘Project Hope’ is almost certainly the most 
successful and professionalised fundraising operation in China.  Since 1989 it has raised more 
than USD 200 million for education projects whose mainstay has been primary school building 
and scholarships.  According to Gan Dongyu, of the Project’s International Department, the 
Foundation aggregate donations from Chinese overseas are substantial, although it is not possible 
to give a precise figure for these as they are not accounted separately.  In particular, Gan says, 
‘thousands’ of Singaporeans have donated CNY 300 (USD 36.5) each in child sponsorship 
programmes, and ‘tens of thousands’ of Hong Kong citizens have made similar individual 
donations. The donations, according to Gan, have come ‘mostly from ordinary people with a 
relatively small amount of money’, and generally in response to media reports on the 
Foundation’s work. 
 
Gan believes that Chinese language newspaper reports were also a major factor in garnering 
some support in North America – combined with the fact that some of the overseas Chinese 
supporters had only recently left China, where the Foundation’s reputation was already 
established. The North American Chinese Education Foundation (NACEF), set up by Chinese 
students in San Francisco and linked to Chinese students associations in 33 American 
universities, began in 1998 to raise funds for Project Hope.  Its contributions appeared relatively 
modest, however, amounting to only around USD 23,000 in the first year, as recorded by the 
NACEF website.56  Also in 1998, according to Gan Dongyu, a Toronto association of former 
Beijing residents collected around CAD 100,000 (USD 60,000) for Project Hope. 
 
These sums are, however, dwarfed by international corporate donations to the Project. It has 
received around USD 2 million apiece from Motorola and Coca Cola, and smaller, but still 
substantial, sums from many others.  It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the overseas 
Chinese constituency has not been targeted more systematically. 
 
It is also worth noting that, from early on, the Youth Development Foundation was plagued by 
allegations of inefficient use, or outright abuse, of funds, including a protracted court case in 
Hong Kong, starting in 1995.  (In this case the Foundation was eventually vindicated but it has 
since been rocked by a new round of scandals.57)  Such events naturally impact on donor trust, 
and in the 1990s a number of Chinese organisations in overseas communities were established to 
raise funds for essentially rival operations: channelling the money to virtually identical projects 
through their own networks.  One of the most successful has been the Hong Kong based Sower’s 
 
Action, established in 1992, which now raises around HKD 17 million (USD 2.2 million) per 
year through public fundraising activities that include an annual sponsored walk from Hong 
Kong to Guangzhou, with participants not only from Hong Kong but also from Chinese 
communities in Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and France.   Sowers Action also has a 
supporting chapter in Vancouver.  Although the organisation has a small administrative staff of 
seven, all of its project identification and monitoring trips to mainland China are carried out by 
volunteers, who liaise directly with local education authorities. Accounts are audited pro bono by 
Peat Marwick.  The higher standards of financial transparency have almost certainly played an 
important part in the group’s fundraising success. 
 
Perhaps learning this lesson, the mainland’s China Charities Federation (CCF) appeared keen to 
make financial transparency and rectitude among its hallmarks when it was founded in 1994, and 
began by publishing annual, audited accounts. Unlike most Chinese foundations, which have 
very limited endowments and rely for income on public fundraising, the CCF tried hard to 
establish an endowment fund, attracting a donation of HKD 25 million (USD 3.25 million) from 
the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation.  The national level Federation, which has more 
than 70 provincial, city or county level affiliated foundations that each raise their own funds, has 
supported emergency relief work, care for orphans and older people, cancer research and ‘dry 
well’ digging in arid areas.   In 1998 it became a member of United Way.  That year was 
something of a zenith for the organisation, when it raised more than CNY 600 million (USD 74 
million) for flood relief – mostly from domestic Chinese sources and multinational corporations. 
 
From the outset, the Federation appointed around a dozen notable figures from the non profit 
sector in Hong Kong and Taiwan as ‘Senior Advisers’ and ‘Specially Invited Council Directors’. 
These include Darwin Chen, CEO of the Hong Kong Community Chest; S. T. Chan, Vice 
President of World Vision International China Programme; Sir Harry Fang, Director of the Hong 
Kong Society for Rehabilitation, and Tuan Cheng Wang of Taiwan’s Buddhist Compassion (Tzu 
Chi) Foundation.  Also appointed were a Canadian Chinese photographer, Walter Poon, and an 
American Chinese pianist, Kong Xiaodong.   The impact of this non-mainland presence was 
perhaps somewhat diluted by a formal governance structure that distributed positions among well 
over 100 people, including Honorary Presidents, Senior Advisers, Vice Presidents, Specially 
Invited Council Directors, and Executive Directors.58  Nevertheless, the inclusion of non-
mainlanders did suggest that the overseas constituency would be targeted pro-actively.  
 
The Federation has indeed maintained links with a number of non-mainland Chinese 
organisations, notably in Hong Kong: the Hong Kong Community Chest and Hong Kong 
Council for Social Services, the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, Po Leung Kuk and Yan Oi.    
But these are ‘experience exchange’ rather than funding relationships, and probably owe much to 
the fact that the Federation’s founding President, Yan Mingfu (a former Vice Minister of Civil 
 
Affairs), was a leading advocate of non-profit sector development in China, and showed a keen 
interest in Hong Kong’s model of social service delivery, which accords a prominent place to 
non-government service providers.  Some funding support has come through joint programmes 
with the World Vision International China Programme, based in Hong Kong, and Oxfam Hong 
Kong; and the Malaysia’s Golden Lion Group corporation, headed by Zhong Tingsen, has 
contributed nearly USD 1 million for disaster relief programmes.  The Federation has also been 
an implementing partner in a Smile Train programme, funded with a USD 20 million donation 
from Chinese American, Charles Wang, of Computer Associates, to provide surgery for children 
with cleft lips and palates.59  But this relationship was not initiated by CCF.  Smile Train was 
actively seeking Chinese partners, and chose CCF as the best fit.60  (Another American Chinese 
philanthropist, Huang Yongle, also donated USD 100,000 for cleft lip and palate operations 
conducted in China by the international organisation, Operation Sunrise.) 
 
Altogether, CCF appears to have done little to reach out directly to potential overseas Chinese 
supporters, and in many ways the organisation seems to have lost the fresh edge with which it 
began.61  In terms of transparency too, the bright start of the CCF appears to have dimmed since 
the retirement, in 2002, of  Yan Mingfu.  The numerous calls we logged to the Federation in 
March and April 2003 yielded more prevarication than information; according to those we spoke 
to, the Federation does not collect funds from overseas Chinese, and our informants were 
unwilling to disclose present sources or level of income.  
 
Shen Zhifei, International Department Director of the All-China Disabled Person’s Federation 
(CDPF), was more forthcoming, but immediately made clear that his organisation does not target 
overseas Chinese donors, or receive much from them.  In fact, CDPF, which was established by 
the government in 1988, seems barely to engage in active fundraising at all.  According to Shen, 
‘We sometimes organise activities like sporting or cultural events [involving people with 
disabilities] but we never target specific groups.  . . .  Usually they [donors] come to us, to seek 
the possibility of having some cooperation.’  Shen says the Federation has been receiving around 
CNY 10 million per year from international sources last year, but this included Official 
Development Assistance cooperation with Unicef and the government of Japan, and grants from 
private foundations such as the Hong Kong based Kadoorie Charitable Foundation. In addition, 
the Federation has recently secured support for two, large scale multi-year projects: a USD 30 
million cataract surgery and blindness prevention funded by the Lions Club International (Hong 
Kong Lions chapters have raised funds vigorously for this), and CNY 110 million (USD 13 
million) from Hong Kong millionaire, Li Kashing, to establish a series of rehabilitation centres.  
Li, Shen notes, has supported numerous projects through the Federation, starting in the early 90s 
with a rehabilitation and vocational training centre in his home town in southern Guangdong.  
However, according to Shen, most of the Federation’s budget comes from the central 
 
government, and the level of government support has been increasing steadily over the last few 
years.  
 
Li Kashing is also the principal donor to the China Disabled Persons’ Welfare Foundation, which 
was established in 1980 but has since been overshadowed by the much larger CDPF, of which it 
is now effectively a fundraising subsidiary.  In 2001 its total income was CNY 19.3 million 
(USD 2.3 million).  Of this, CNY 13.7 million came from ‘overseas’, of which 12.2 million was 
donated by of Li’s companies.  A further CNY 1 million came from a Hong Kong tobacco 
company, and CNY 0.5 million from private individuals.62  The funds were used to support 
artificial limb programmes, training of teachers for the deaf, schooling for blind children and 
massotherapy training for blind adults, and community based rehabilitation projects in inland and 
Western provinces.  Again, the Foundation appeared to be a largely passive recipient of Li’s and 
other donors’ largesse.  According to a spokesman, promotional activities largely consist in 
organisation of events such as tours by a disabled person’s arts group, and fundraising is ‘not 
targeted’, although the Foundation ‘welcomes support from all sorts of donors’.  
 
The China Children and Teenagers Fund, established by the Women’s Federation in 1981, 
currently raises around CNY 60 million per year, mostly from Chinese corporations but also 
from the general public.  It has recently begun to appeal for donations through cellphone short 
text messages. According to Xu Xiaoguang of the International Department, the Fund has never 
attempted to attract funds from overseas Chinese donors, but is in principle interested in the 
possibility of doing so, and is trying to build up connections through networks of overseas 
alumni of Xiamen and Beijing universities.  But, says Xu, ‘we don’t have enough information, or 
really know how to go about this.’  In March, 2002, the Foundation sent an exploratory 
delegation to Europe, to try to make connections with international organisations such as the 
World Children’s Foundation, and with European Chinese communities.   This foray has not yet 
produced significant funding results.  A follow up trip was planned for 2003, but was cancelled 
owing to the SARS epidemic. 
 
A rising star in the firmament of China’s official non profit sector is the Poverty Alleviation 
Foundation, established in 1989 but achieving little public prominence until it was reorganised in 
2000 under the dynamic leadership of He Daofeng.  Since then it has doubled its income to CNY 
58.6 million in 2001 (USD 7.1 million); a success its Annual Report ascribes to ‘researching and 
designing our projects to lead in the market’ and developing ‘famous brand poverty reduction 
proejcts’ as ‘leading products’.  But this ambitious and aggressively marketed foundation has not 
explored the fundraising potential of overseas Chinese communities.  A quarter of total funds 
raised in 2001 came from overseas sources, but overwhelmingly from international 
organisations, notably, the Kadoorie Foundation, Mercy Corps, Ford Foundation and Asian 
Development Bank.   
 
 
Even the Soong Ching Ling Foundation, with its overseas branches and a brand-name 
historically linked with the diaspora, seems to have been unable to capitalise on these 
advantages.  According to Deng Hongqing of the organisation’s International Department, just 
1.37% of income came from overseas in 2002, with a further 13% from Hong Kong and Tawian.  
Despite having this breakdown at his fingertips, Deng says the Foundation does not 
systematically target donors overseas.  This has to be seen, however, in light of the fact that, as a 
pillar of the nation’s politico-cultural patrimony, the Foundation remains heavily subsidised by 
government, so its appointed officials have little incentive to raise funds aggressively. 
 
This brief survey therefore suggests that the official non profit sector has not yet greatly exerted 
itself to seek funds from Chinese communities overseas.  Funding that has come from these 
communities appears to have been received passively rather than actively sought. China’s 
universities, by contrast, evidently see private philanthropy as a critical resource for expansion 
and development, and have been much more pro-active in seeking support from Chinese abroad.  
 
The go-getting universities 
 
Since 1994, Tsinghua University, which is considered the ‘MIT of China,’ has raised some CNY 
420 million (USD 50.8 million).  Fully 70 percent of that has come from donors living in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, says Huang Jianhua, director of the Tsinghua University Education 
Foundation.  Similarly, Deng Ya of the Beijing University Foundation reports that of the CNY 
800 million (USD 97 million) raised since 1989, 65 percent has come from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. 
 
A tour of the two campuses easily yields examples of such generosity. Over the past decade, 
Tsinghua, China’s top university for the sciences and technology, has experienced a building 
boom.  Almost all of the buildings located on the eastern end of campus – gray concrete and 
granite behemoths lining a long, landscaped lawn and fountains – are brand new.   This new 
section of campus is nicknamed the ‘White District’ (Bai Qu), since in Revolutionary times, 
white was the color for capitalists, while red was the color for communists, and most of the 
buildings were built with generous donations from Hong Kong capitalists. 
 
Tsinghua's  new library was built by Hong Kong's Sir Run Run Shaw in 1990.  Li Ka Hsing 
provided a similar donation for Beida's new library.   Li Guowei, (Q.W. Lee) President of Hang 
Seng Bank, provided funds for Tsinghua's business school and a life sciences building.  Liang 
Chiu Ju, also of Hang Seng, provided the funds for the architecture school.  Li Kashing pledged 
USD 10 million USD for Tsinghua's new  IT park.  Wu Shun De (of the HK restaurant chain, 
 
Maxim’s) provided the capital for the Design Institute and the Tsinghua Museum.  The new 
Tsinghua gymnasium, was also the gift of Cao Guangbiao, a Hong Kong donor. 
 
None of this is by accident.  Once solely supported by government funds, elite universities such 
as Tsinghua University and Peking University have sought to raise the extra sums they need to 
be truly world-class institutions by creating development and fundraising arms modelled after 
those at major U.S. universities such as Harvard and Berkeley. 
 
Mr. Huang says many of these donations were vigorously courted by the University.   The 
University president travels frequently to Hong Kong and Taiwan, cultivating relationships with 
potential donors, Huang says. He will bring lots of brochures and persuasive fundraising 
materials, presenting a ‘wish list’ of projects for donors to look over.  If the donor seems 
uninterested in funding these projects, then, they are asked what they would prefer to fund… and 
accommodations are made. 
 
Hong Kong entrepreneurs have been such generous benefactors to Tsinghua because they believe 
that making a donation to a top university is one quick way to establish their own reputations on 
the mainland, Huang says.  In 1997, as the HK prepared to return to China, Tsinghua received a 
tidal wave of major gifts from Hong Kong people.  ‘They came to us,’ Huang says.  ‘They 
wanted to show their status as major business players in China. They want to show the central 
government, too.’  
 
The sums donated by Hong Kong Chinese dwarf those that have been donated by Chinese 
Americans. ‘We’re not very satisfied with what we’ve raised from the U.S,’ Huang says.  
However, both Tsing Hua and Beijing University have registered subsidiary foundations in the 
United States to develop American fundraising.  
 
So far, most donations from Chinese Americans to the universities have been relatively small in 
scale:  successful entrepreneurs establishing modest scholarships for needy or outstanding 
students.  One donor, a Ms. Xin Yu Xi, a U.S. cosmetics tycoon, has set aside scholarship money 
at Beida for the top female student from every province in China.    
 
Fundraising among Chinese Americans has been comparatively anemic for a number of reasons.   
Of the more than 10,000 Tsinghua alumni in the US, most have not reached the levels of wealth 
that will enable them to endow buildings or professorships. ‘Most of them are just now 
beginning to make money,’ he says.  The pool of established Chinese Americans with direct ties 
to the mainland is relatively small, since mainland Chinese immigration was cut off after the 
Communist revolution and only restarted after the ‘reform and opening’ of the late ‘70s.   
 
 
While there are undoubtedly successful Chinese Americans, many trace their roots to Taiwan 
and are more interested in helping Taiwan. Others seem to be more focused on philanthropic 
projects in the United States.  ‘Chinese-Americans care more about what U.S. society thinks of 
them, while Hong Kong Chinese see China as their own market,’ Huang says.  Still, Huang is 
optimistic, as China's place continues to rise in the world, and mainland immigrants rise to 
prominence.  ‘Maybe in 10-20 years more Chinese-Americans will look to China for their 
donations.’ 
 
Beijing and Tsinghua are not the only universities to have established independent foundations to 
raise funds abroad.  Shanghai's Jiaotong University Foundation has raised tens of millions of 
dollars – most from Hong Kong donors – since its establishment in 2001.  Xiamen University 
benefits from a variety of ‘education development’ foundations – whose support mainly come 
from overseas Chinese and foreign enterprises.63  The Xiamen University Alumni Association of 
America has also been active in raising funds for their alma mater.  Sun Yat Sen University in 
Guangzhou benefits from the support of the US-based Lingnan Foundation, which was founded 
in 1893 to support the development of a college in Guangzhou that was later merged into Sun 
Yat Sen University.  Shanghai's Fudan University also has an active alumni association in the 
United States.  Recently, the organization's Northern California chapter raised scholarship funds 
for an orphaned student who had been accepted by Fudan University, after reading of his plight 
in a Chinese-American paper. 
 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, the missing link and the international bridge 
 
It is logical enough for the universities to target Hong Kong and Taiwan for donations, both 
because these parts of ‘Greater China’ have a well established philanthropic tradition – in Hong 
Kong’s case, with non-profit schools, hospitals and community groups dating back more than a 
century – and because, as the principal investors in China, the Hong Kong and Taiwan business 
communities have a strong interest in maintaining good relations with the mainland government.  
Donations from Hong Kong surged in the run-up to its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. 
 
Probably the most prominent donor has been Hong Kong’s Li Kashing, whose Cheung Kong and 
Hutchison Whampoa companies have very substantial business interests on the mainland, 
including contracts to build deep sea ports. In the late 1970s, Li provided a total of HKD 2 
billion (USD 260 million) to build a university with a medical school and five attached teaching 
hospitals in his home town of Shantou, Guangdong. On completion of the university in 1981, Li 
registered a foundation in Hong Kong to support a wide range of education, medical and cultural 
heritage preservation projects.64  In 2001 the foundation made a HKD 300 million (USD 38 
million) donation for development of education and healthcare in Western China.  The funds are 
being used to support distance learning for middle schools, college scholarships for ethnic 
 
minorities, an inter-college IT network and a physician’s training programme at Qinghai 
University.  A Cheung Kong Scholars Programme has provided HKD 70 million (USD 9 
million) funding for academic awards and professorships in Chinese universities – with the 
familiar hope of attracting back Chinese scholars trained overseas.  Another project, currently 
receiving HKD 20 million (USD 2.6 million) per year, supports the development of hospice 
services in 20 mainland hospitals.  
 
Li is by no means unique among Hong Kong’s millionaires in investing part of his wealth in 
philanthropic projects in China.  Numerous less public figures do likewise and some, like Chen 
Jiageng (Tan Kah Kee) before them, appear to regard their contribution as the culmination of 
their life’s work. For example, property developer, Yu Panglin, is reported to have recently 
invested CNY 2 billion (USD 241 million), nearly his entire fortune, in a 57 storey hotel in 
Shenzhen, with future profits to be devoted to education projects through a local foundation that 
will inherit the hotel.65   
 
Because of the culture of privacy surrounding greater China philanthropy, it is extremely hard to 
guess, much less calculate, how much is transferred each year from the accounts of the Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwanese super-rich to development or social welfare projects on the 
mainland. But there can be little doubt that this far exceeds the USD 80 million or so that United 
Nations organisations loan or grant each year to China.66   The apparent modesty of many greater 
China donors is greatly compounded by the reticence of the Chinese authorities. The 1998 Public 
Welfare Donations Law includes two Articles explicitly stating that the Department of Overseas 
Chinese Affairs – the Qiaoban – is the appropriate body for channelling such donations. But, as 
far as we were able to determine, nowhere in China are such donations publicly documented, and 
the Qiaoban  itself has proved unwilling to discuss the subject with us.  It is evident from 
sporadic Chinese media reports that the assistance extends well beyond the traditional Qiaoxiang 
counties of overseas Chinese origin.  But the lack of any transparency in this process leaves us 
guessing what gifts, favours and banquets may be involved in it, or what proportion of the funds 
donated may reach the intended beneficiaries.  This is this is the most important missing link in 
our brief research. 
 
Hong Kong may, however, also be serving as a bridgehead for philanthropy with a stronger 
tradition of public accountability and transparency.   In the 1980s, a number of international 
NGOs began raising funds there.  Prominent among them was Oxfam.  In 1976, a small group of 
expatriates had established a fundraising support operation in the then British colony for Oxfam 
UK.  This was so successful that it was soon virtually propelled into assuming an ‘operational’ 
role, not just raising funds but implementing projects under its own ‘Oxfam Hong Kong’ banner.  
Today, according to Executive Director, Chong Changyau, Oxfam has more than 60,000 regular 
supporters among Hong Kong’s population of 7 million, and aside from this raises at least HKD 
 
2 million per year in an annual ‘Trailwalker’ sponsored walk that has become a major social and 
charitable event in Hong Kong’s calendar.  Save the Children Hong Kong similarly started out as 
a fundraising exercise for its parent Save the Children UK but, in 1998, became independent and 
started implementing its own projects in China. Hong Kong also provides a secure fundraising 
and administrative base for the World Vision International China program, whose advertisements 
on subway hoardings now compete with those of Médecins Sans Frontières, which has also 
started to raise funds in Hong Kong to support its international operations, although a Hong 
Kong chapter of the organisation has not yet emerged.  The success of these fundraising 
ventures, like that of Sowers Action, shows that there is considerable ‘demand’ among ordinary 
Chinese donors for professionalised and trustworthy charitable outlets.  
 
Another organization that has targeted such donors is The Nature Conservancy, a US based 
environmental group that has been working since 1999 to protect 6.5 million acres of 
environmentally sensitive land  in Yunnan Province.  Early on, the Nature Conservancy 
recognized that Chinese ‘wealth centers’ in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the United 
States could be tapped to support the work in Yunnan, according to Ed Norton, Senior Advisor to 
the project.  The organization has opened a Hong Kong office, with a staff of three to raise 
awareness about biodiversity conservation in the region.  In May 2002, it took a group of Hong 
Kong businessmen to Yunnan to visit the conservation sites.  This inspired the entrepreneurs, 
among them Peter Wang, CEO of Tristate Holdings, which manufactures the Nautica clothing 
line, to form a USD 2 million Asia Conservation Trust to benefit the Nature Conservancy.  
Similarly, the Conservancy has sought out the support of Chinese American donors.  Working 
through staff and volunteers in communities with a high proportion of Chinese in the United 
States, TNC has made efforts to promote the project among Chinese American organizations, 
and to place stories about the project in the Chinese American press.  The Committee of 100, a 
Chinese American organization, had planned to visit the Yunnan project site this year, although 
the trip was cancelled due to concerns about the atypical pneumonia (SARS) outbreak.  Still, the 
Conservancy has raised about USD 100,000 from Chinese American donors.  This has not been 
entirely straightforward, says Norton, since ‘We realized that the subject in which the Chinese 
American donors were most interested was education.’  But the Conservancy has worked to 
create opportunities to support both education and environment.  One donor, for instance, is 
supporting the construction of biogas stoves – to replace charcoal-burning – in a dozen village 
schools.  ‘We're very happy with the results so far,’ Norton says.  ‘Everybody recognizes there's 
a job here of developing an interest, cultivating a habit [among Overseas Chinese donors] of 
giving for environmental causes.’ 
 
Apart from its Hong Kong fundraising operation, World Vision also targets Chinese 
communities in Canada, the United States and Australia, looking for donors to sponsor child 
beneficiaries of the China program, according to the organisation’s Yunnan program manager, 
 
Wang Chao. Videos and movies about World Vision's work have been specially prepared for and 
aired on Chinese-language television stations.  Chinese radio stations are also targeted for 
fundraising appeals.  All these efforts have been very successful, Wang says. 
Several international organisations, including Unicef and the World Wide Fund for Nature, are 
now trying to find ways to start fundraising operations on the Chinese mainland, with an eye 
particularly on the corporate sector and the relatively wealthy urban communities along the east 
coast.  These ambitions are currently thwarted by legal and tax obstacles, and may in future have 
to contend with local protectionism from Chinese non profit organisations. But Hong Kong 
based organisations, including both well-known brands, such as Oxfam, World Vision, the 
Salvation Army and Save the Children, and the many smaller groups established by Hong Kong 
Chinese, may have a special role in future, consistent with the entrepot nature of Hong Kong’s 
economy, as brokers of more Westernised forms of giving with a Chinese identity.   
 
Chinese American philanthropic organisations 
  
Although Chinese Americans have not donated to China on the same scale as people in Hong 
Kong, several philanthropic organisations with a specific focus on China have emerged, along 
with networks of individuals who give not only money but time and care to make sure that it 
reaches its intended beneficiaries. 
 
Cyrus Tang (Tang Zhongying), who left Jiangsu Province for the United States in 1950, made 
his fortune building a steel, scrap metal, office furniture and pharmaceutical empire.  Known 
collectively as Tang Industries, the company appears regularly on Forbes’ biggest private 
companies list.  In 1995, he created the Tang Foundation, which supports Traditional Chinese 
Medicine research centers in Beijing and Chicago and has provided more than USD 7 million for 
school construction and scholarships for poor college students.  Since 1997, some 1,300 students 
attending 15 colleges nationwide have received grants of about USD 500 a year.  Similarly, poor 
communities in 12 provinces have been beneficiaries of Tang Foundation school construction 
grants, says Zhang Xiaoli, a representative of the Foundation’s China office.  Tang visits his 
Jiangsu hometown about twice a year – and tries to meet with scholarship recipients whenever he 
visits.  ‘Mr. Tang hopes to cultivate a sense of social responsibility among the students,’ says 
Zhang.  ‘In exchange for their scholarships, students are asked to perform public service while 
they are in school.’ 
 
Another  multimillion dollar fund is The China Foundation, founded in 1997 by Dr. Jane Hu – an 
immigrant to the U.S. from Taiwan and a scientist who served in an appointed position in the 
first Bush Administration.  According to Dr. Xiang Qian Dai, the Foundation's Beijing 
representative, Dr. Hu had retired, and was looking for a way to help China, when she decided to 
 
pull together her network of corporate friends to help fund health care and education programs in 
China.  Former President Gerald Ford is honorary Chairman of the Board. 
 
The China Foundation’s biggest project to date has been to raise about USD 10 million (entirely 
from the Gates Foundation) for a World Bank project to build hospitals in rural areas.  The  Bank 
had allocated USD 100 million to this project, but asked China to come up with matching funds, 
which the China Foundation stepped in to raise.   
 
The China Foundation also organizes health conferences on the mainland and supports a smaller 
project to build schools in rural areas.  Seven or eight schools have been built with money from 
individual investors.  Dr. Dai says the schools are worthier and more successful than the 
hospitals, simply because of Chinese values.  ‘If a farmer gets sick, he won’t go spend money to 
see a doctor, but he will still do everything he can to make sure his children can go to school.’    
 
Dr. Dai says that while the foundation is run by Dr. Hu and a raft of Chinese Americans hold 
honorary titles in the foundation, only a very small proportion of the funds actually come from 
overseas Chinese: the Taiwan and Hong Kong fundraising offices have raised very little, and 
Chinese Americans have not been particularly generous.  The biggest individual donation came 
from Charles Wang – USD 100,000 for school building.   
 
In Dai’s view, Chinese Americans have not been particularly generous for several reasons.  
Firstly, ‘Overseas Chinese with money don’t want to give because they don’t want to support the 
Communist government. They’ll do business in China, but they won’t donate money.’  If they do 
donate funds, ‘they see the donation as way to open doors for other business projects and 
investments.  Taiwan people want introductions and access to leaders in exchange for their 
donations.’  Secondly, donors are distrustful of the mainland’s reputation for corruption.  They 
feel an investment in business is the best use of their funds.  Thirdly, most mainland immigrants 
to the US have yet to make vast sums of money. 
 
In Dai’s opinion Chinese Americans – the majority of whom still come from Taiwan or Hong 
Kong – still don’t understand China.  ‘They don’t like the mainland,’ he says.  ‘It is easier to 
raise money from white people.’  But he is also optimistic that the flows from the U.S. China 
would increase  ‘because China is now very strong.  Hong Kong has returned to China… many 
changes are coming.’ 
 
Despite Dai’s scepticism, several groups of Chinese Americans have come together to launch 
small-scale, hands-on efforts to tackle poverty and improve education in China.  Among these is 
SOAR, a San Francisco Bay-Area non-profit founded by a group of Chinese Americans in 1995 
to provide scholarships to middle school and high school students living in some of China's 
 
poorest villages. The organization has provided more than a thousand scholarships of  USD 85 a 
year for middle school students; and USD 225 a year for high school students. Forty SOAR 
scholarship recipients have gone on to college, including top universities such as Beijing 
University.  ‘So many Chinese have gone overseas, but they haven't forgotten their roots.  To 
know that there are Chinese people like (the SOAR donors), I feel very proud to be Chinese,’ 
says Wu Yueling, a freshman at the Beijing Institute of Technology.  Wu, whose mother is 
disabled and whose father makes about USD 25-30 a month hauling passengers on his pedicab, 
depended on seven years' of SOAR scholarships to stay in middle and high school.  ‘My parents 
keep telling me, “so many people are supporting you, don't let them down.”  I hope I can find 
some way to pay society back.’   
 
SOAR relies on a base of 400-500 donors, all of whom come from the Bay area, and have been 
introduced to the organization through word of mouth, says Albert Hu, president of SOAR and 
an immigrant from Taiwan.  Many donors choose to sponsor a specific child, for USD 85 or 
USD 225 year; others donate unrestricted lump sums to the organization.  Silicon Valley tycoons 
have provided regular, annual donations of USD 25,000, while one year a teacher donated USD 
200,000.  There a few salaried coordinators in China, but no paid staff in the United States, and 
board members – most of whom are first generation immigrants from Taiwan – work for free.   
Board members undertake regular 'fact finding' missions to ensure that the money is properly 
spent, and that the scholarship recipients are indeed receiving their money.   
 
The Zigen Fund, founded in New York in 1988, is a similar organization that, in addition to 
scholarships, helps build and refurbish rural schools, libraries and health centers.  (‘Zigen’ means 
‘noursish the roots’) It depends on a small base of 800 – 1,000 mostly Chinese American donors 
who give USD 50 – 500 per year. While discussions are underway to expand the organization, no 
large scale efforts at fundraising have been attempted, says President Bik Lam, an immigrant 
from Hong Kong. 
 
Like SOAR, Zigen puts a premium on effectiveness and accountability.  Board members make 
regular fact finding missions to their projects.  The organization avoids working with the Chinese 
education authorities, which in past have not been as responsible with funds, but seeks out 
trustworthy local partners for projects.  Lam says raising female attendance from 10 percent to 
100 percent in many of their targeted villages has been one of Zigen's greatest accomplishments. 
 
Giving of a different kind has been facilitated by the Center for US-China Arts Exchange, 
established in 1978 by Chou Wen-Chung.  A veteran of the ‘Flying Tigers’ during the war 
against Japan, Chou emigrated to the United States in 1946 and, although already a qualified 
civil engineer, studied composition at the New England Conservatory.  He became a renowned 
composer and is now Professor of Composition at Columbia University, where he established the 
 
Arts Exchange center.  In the 1980s this worked to make contemporary music scores and 
recordings available in China and, collaborated in the award winning film ‘From Mao to Mozart’ 
organised a Beijing production of ‘Death of a Salesman’, directed by Arthur Miller.  During the 
1990s, the Center oversaw a Ford Foundation funded program to document and preserve ethnic 
minority art and craft in Yunnan province.  This involved establishing a degree course in 
traditional arts at the Yunnan Minorities Institute, and working with local authorities to design an 
ethnographic museum of ethnic minority culture in the provincial capital, Kunming.  
 
New philanthropist returnees 
 
Still other Chinese Americans have returned to China to oversee their philanthropic works in 
person.   In 1999, Randy Yeh, the Chinese American representative for Lucent Technologies in 
Beijing, took early retirement and sold enough of his stock to create a USD 1 million foundation 
based in the United States.  Hoping to make a difference in Beijing, where he has chosen to 
retire, he has transferred USD 150,000 of that sum to endow a new NGO under the auspices of 
the China Youth Development Foundation.  Although the money has been officially donated to 
CYDF, Yeh says he retains full control of the funds, which will be used to support four main 
goals:  NGO capacity building, facilitation of volunteering, medical assistance for the needy, and 
the care of elderly and disabled.   
 
Yeh, who was born in China and grew up in Taiwan before emigrating to the United States, says 
it is largely coincidental that his philanthropy is directed at China: ‘I just happen to be living in 
China.’  Yet, he says, if his company had not posted him to Beijing many years ago his ‘giving 
would have been much less, more superficial, like just giving a check’.  He believes that his 
efforts have been easier because of his Chinese heritage.  ‘I can go into a much deeper 
relationship with the people here because of a shared cultural and language background . . . 
When you have a deeper relationship, it becomes a lot easier to do things here.  That's the same 
for business.’ 
 
Yeh’s highly personal vision of social development turns on helping others to contribute their 
time and good will as volunteers in the community.  But he believes that people can only give 
when they are ready to, and when they have a sense of personal sufficiency.  Thus, his New Path 
Foundation does not aggressively promote volunteerism, but rather seeks ways to create 
opportunities, for those who are ‘ready’, to make an effective contribution.  The foundation has 
provided travel expenses for volunteers to visit retirement homes and residential facilities for 
disabled children, and it is now working on a scheme to provide advice and support services to 
groups of individuals wishing to establish new social service NGOs.  
 
 
Another returned American Chinese philanthropist is Zhou Yan, who spent many years living 
abroad working for multinational banks, and now calls Shenzhen home.  She founded the Phelex 
Foundation, registered in the United States, in 1995.  Its goal is to help rural schools generate the 
income they need to subsidize tuition by running small, sustainable businesses – such as tea 
farms, pigeon coops and vegetable gardens. 
 
Over the past eight years, Phelex has donated  some USD 3 million to rural schools. The funds 
come almost exclusively from foreign donors: about 20 percent from Chinese Americans and 
another 30 percent from Hong Kong Chinese.   Fan Ying, who manages the foundation’s 
operations, says it is coincidental that overseas Chinese have contributed half of the funds, since 
the organization has made no efforts to target these communities for fundraising.  In fact, the 
biggest donations still come from ‘white’ foreigners from the financial world who are friends of 
the founder.   
 
Typical of another new  kind of  returned philanthropist, albeit one who has committed time and 
energy rather than money, is Dr. Tan Leshan, a native of Yunnan Province.  In 1987, Tan began 
to study for a doctorate in anthropology at Cornell University.   He was joined there by his wife 
and seven year old daughter in early 1989.  Following the events of June 4, 1989, Tan’s wife and 
daughter applied for and received American citizenship.  His daughter has since spent twelve 
years in American schools, and is currently a junior at Cornell.   Dr. Tan did not himself apply 
for US citizenship because, he says, this would have complicated travel to and from China – and 
he was always quite clear that he wanted to continue to play an active role in China’s social 
development.67 
 
To this day, Tan remains a green card holding ‘American permanent resident’, but most of his 
time is spent in China, even though this means long periods of absence from his family in the 
United States.  Following a short stint teaching at Cornell, he took as job in 1999 as Deputy 
China Programme Director of Save the Children Fund (UK) in his native Yunnan, where he 
oversaw a programme that included sensitive and ground-breaking work in areas such as 
HIV/AIDS prevention among sex workers and drug users, and prevention of the trafficking of 
women and children.   In 2001, Tan moved on to become China Country Director of the well-
known blindness prevention agency, Project Orbis International, a post he still holds.    
 
Dr. Tan’s engagement with non-profit public benefit work in China contrasts interestingly with 
the experience of his brother, Tan Leshui, a wildlife documentary film-maker who never left 
Yunnan. In the early ‘90s, Tan Leshui set up his own ‘Man and Nature Foundation’ in Yunnan, 
to promote environmental awareness and nature conservation.  After a few years he was obliged 
to abandon this work when the government raised the capital endowment threshold for registered 
foundations to CNY 2 million (USD 240,000), a sum that he could not raise.  This is richly 
 
illustrative of the way in which the Chinese state’s current ‘management’ of the non-profit sector 
constrains the creativity of some of its most public-spirited citizens. The story also shows the 
comparative advantage enjoyed by public-spirited Chinese people who have been empowered by 
their overseas experience and connections.    
 
Tan Leshan is beginning to consider his retirement plans.  He hopes to build a bamboo house in 
Hosai Village, a poor and remote community on Yunnan’s border with Burma, and to divide his 
time between there and the United States.  Hosai is where he spent seven years as a ‘sent-down 
youth’ during the Cultural Revolution.  Although now widely reviled both in China and overseas, 
this forcible experiment in cultural exchange did evidently kindle, in at least some hearts and 
minds, enduring attachments that take Chinese philanthropy beyond traditional support for kin 
and the ancestral home.   
 
It was just such an experience that eventually resulted in the Candlelight Project to help rural 
schoolteachers. This started in 1994 with a gift of USD 3,000 from an American Chinese scholar.  
The money was entrusted to a friend back in China, who was asked to use it for the benefit of 
schoolteachers in Baoding Prefecture of Hebei Province, where the donor and his friend had both 
been ‘rusticated’ during the Cultural Revolution.  The project has since expanded and is now run 
under the auspices of the China Charities Federation with support from World Vision. 
 
Wang Chao, of World Vision, is another recent émigré who found his way back to work in social  
development.   A native of Hubei Province, and graduate of Beijing University, Wang moved to 
Canada to study urban planning at the University of Montreal.  But, after gaining Canadian 
citizenship and earning a PhD in Urban and Regional Development, Wang was ready to go 
home.  ‘I wanted to do some work that was more related to China’.  A friend recommended that 
he talk to World Vision.  They warned him that he was overqualified for the job opening they 
had – as a rural development program officer in Yunnan province, but Wang took the job 
anyway. His Canadian boss offered to keep a job open for him for six months, in case he decided 
to come back to Canada.   
 
‘Six months turned into three years,’ Wang says, and as yet he has no plans to return to Canada.  
Moving to Yunnan with his wife, the urban planner found himself helping villagers build 
schools, introduce new crops, and learn new, more efficient methods of farming.  He says his 
‘dual identity’ as a Chinese and a Canadian helped him in his work.  ‘Dealing with the 
government is easier because . . . they don't see me as a stranger, a foreigner,’ he says. ‘We have 
a common language and a common experience.’  A shared cultural background has enabled him 
to understand both the cadres’ and the villagers’ points of view, he says. 
 
 
Wang is not the only expatriate of Chinese descent working for World Vision in Yunnan.  Ten of 
World Vision's 50 employees are ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the 
North America.  Most are drawn to China as much by their Christian faith as their ethnicity, 
Wang says.  ‘They feel the call,’ he says.   
 
Other faith based organisations, such as Hong Kong’s Christian Action and Jian Hua Foundation, 
and many smaller groups, actively recruit ethnic Chinese people from Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and further afield to work as volunteers on the mainland.  Most secular international NGOs with 
established programs in China also receive frequent enquiries from young American Chinese 
looking for internship opportunities or volunteer work, often wishing to combine this with 
Chinese language study and the chance to become better acquainted with the land their parents 
left.  The demography of the diaspora suggests that such returnee visitors will grow steadily in 
number, alongside growth of ethnic Chinese students from overseas undertaking postgraduate 
fieldwork in China. The numbers who manage to find suitable placements (or subjects of study) 
are doubtless very small by comparison with the numbers of those looking for career 
opportunities in the corporate world; but they may nonetheless play a significant role in fostering 




But, of course, not all of China’s émigrés are willing to help ‘build the Chinese nation’ without 
revision to the political foundations on which it is built.  The diaspora includes many people 
who, in the tradition of Sun Yatsen, are essentially political exiles, such as the Chinese American 
human rights activist labor rights activist, Han Dongfang, who left for Hong Kong after being 
imprisoned for his role in the 1989 Tiananmen protests.  They and many like them have 
remained prominent critics of China’s human rights performance, and irritants to the Chinese 
government for the damage they may cause to the country’s trading relationship with the West. 
Yet, despite the sympathy many in the diaspora may feel for their position, there is little sign that 
they present a serious threat to, or a concerted movement to overturn, the Communist 
government.  The world at large, significantly driven no doubt by commercial and political 
interests, has chosen ‘constructive engagement’ with China rather than isolation of it; and 
diasporan dissidents seem unlikely to be able to reverse that trend. 
 
Perhaps of greater concern to Beijing at present is the quasi-Buddhist Falun Gong sect, whose 
self proclaimed ‘divine’ leader, Li Hongzhi, resides in the United States.  But in this case it is 
almost certainly not the overseas organisation that worries Beijing so much as the fact that the 
movement evidently enjoys considerable support within China, despite a sustained campaign to 
crack down on it.  Here, repressive tactics run the danger of reinforcing, rather than undermining, 
loyalty to the sect.  Whether Falun Gong grows as a threat to the legitimacy of the regime is 
 
likely to depend largely on whether the government is able to deliver adequate social protections 
to the predominantly elderly, ‘reform loser’ citizens who have been is main adherents.   
 
Another special case is that of Tibet.  Since China’s reassertion of control over Tibet in 1959, 
well over a million Tibetans have left for India and the West, where there is widespread public 
sympathy for the cause of Tibetan independence.  But the prospects for this seem rather remote. 
Perhaps for this reason, although the international ‘Tibet lobby’ remains vocal and strong, some 
diasporan Tibetans have over the last two decades also devoted considerable energy to raising 
funds for development projects in ethnic Tibetan areas of the People’s Republic. Often these are 
organised by religious leaders, who evidently retain a strong sense of ministry to their home 
communities. A case in point is the Rinpoche Dr. Alkong Tulku.  He left Tibet in 1963 and now 
has British nationality serving as Abbot of the Samye Ling monastic centre in the valleys of 
Eskdalemuir, Scotland.  This has become a flourishing international centre of Tibetan Buddhist 
teaching and charitable activity.  In addition to offering religious instruction and hosting retreats, 
it runs soup kitchens in Scottish cities and provides sheltered accommodation for people 
recovering from mental illness. The Eskdalemuir centre has become a hub for similar, but 
smaller facilities in numerous Western countries. In 1980, Alkong Tulku founded the Rokpa 
Trust, to raise funds for cultural preservation, education and social welfare projects in Tibet.  By 
2001, this was channelling more than USD 2 million per year to projects in Tibet, implemented 
through local networks and by local communities.  Although he eschews Chinese government 
channels for delivering this assistance, Alkong Rinpoche is able to visit Tibet every year to 
oversee progress and identify new projects.  
 
In 1998 another diasporan Rinpoche, Namkhai Norbu, established in Rome the Association for 
International Solidarity with Asia. This has succeeded in obtaining millions of dollars from the 
Italian government, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the European 
Union for a variety of health and education projects in China.  Again, the government of China 
has acquiesced and indeed actively cooperated in the implementation of these projects.    
 
Thus, despite the rifts between Beijing and the self-proclaimed Tibetan government in exile, 
some diasporan Tibetans have chosen to support community development efforts in Tibet as a 
direct and immediate way of improving the lives (and preserving the religion and culture) of the 
people there.  This does not necessarily imply endorsement of Chinese rule in Tibet, but it does 
imply a pragmatic determination to engage with development processes within the existing 
power structure.  
 
At present, therefore, political dissidence may be a sub-plot in China-diaspora relations, but it is 
not one that significantly threatens the Beijing regime. A more central preoccupation of Beijing’s 
is the status of Taiwan. This of course remains the subject of intense diplomatic efforts, which do 
 
touch the diaspora, as one locus for the debate about independence or incorporation.  But even 
here the trend is perhaps away from polarisation, as the growing economic links between the 
island and the mainland generate, if not concensus, at least a strong mutual interest in achieving a 




The economic importance of the diaspora to the Chinese state is incontestable. This makes it a 
constituency worth courting; and, in the case of those ‘overseas Chinese’ closest to the mainland, 
whose personal fortunes are most closely interwoven with those of China, the interest is clearly 
reciprocated.  Much contemporary diasporan philanthropy appears to be bound up with this 
business relationship, although still significantly influenced by the cultural imperative of 
investing in and honouring the place of origin.    
 
Giving directly to government agencies, through the Department for Overseas Chinese Affairs, is 
much less than transparent, and may involve significant leakages.  (The 1998 Public Welfare 
Donations Law, which attends mainly to the ‘rights of donors’, may perhaps have been a 
calculated attempt to address these problems).  The government initiated ‘official non profit 
sector’ appears either too disorganised, or else too disadvantaged vis à vis the Qiaoban and the 
Qiaolian, to realise the potential availability of income from overseas Chinese communities.  
Universities, which are more aggressively market driven and have the added fundraising 
advantage of traditional Chinese respect for scholarship, do better, but currently look first to 
wealthy Hong Kong and Taiwanese donors; this may change, however, as newer alumni prosper 
further afield. China’s independent, citizen-initiated non-profit organisations, by contrast, seem 
on the whole not to have considered overseas Chinese communities as a source of funds, 
probably in large part because they lack access to them: if they do look overseas for funding, it is 
in the main to non-Chinese international development organisations with representative offices 
in China.  Yet the success of some international and Hong Kong based organisations in targeting 
and raising funds from ethnic Chinese communities suggests that there could be considerable 
demand for transparent and effective channels of charitable giving, if these were cultivated.  
 
Although government looms large in collection of philanthropic contributions, it is also the case 
that active donors are quite free to explore other channels; and some of the most committed 
establish their own organisations, mobilising and distributing funds through personal contacts 
and networks.  
 
Nyiri argues that China sees, or attempts to co-opt, its diaspora as a culturally unified group 
whose loyalty and patriotism – to China, rather than to the countries they have moved to – can be 
retained.  This may accurately convey Chinese government thinking, yet the success of such a 
 
 project evidently depends on the extent of assimilation, and the extent to which diasporan people 
adopt the values of their host communities in core areas, such as rule of law and human rights, 
where China still claims a difference with Western values.  The diaspora includes not only 
entrepreneurs and technicians in new industries, who arguably do have a vested interest in 
maintaining commercial and scientific links with China, but also scholars, professionals in many 
fields, artists, etc, whose fortunes are not necessarily interwoven with those of the mainland. 
Those who retain professional, personal and philanthropic links with China may not only draw 
cultural reinforcement from this contact, but also serve as a bridge for the introduction of ideas 
and attitudes acquired outside. Cultural exchange is a two-way street.  
 
Generational change is a critically important factor here. We were told by the Qiaolian that 
donations came overwhelmingly from first generation emigrants. Their children, born and 
educated overseas, will certainly stand in a quite different relation to their parents’ native place; 
particularly those raised in North America and Europe, where societies are becoming more 
racially heterogencous, making acculturation easier. The changing nature of the family as a 
global institution is another important factor.  Chinese philanthropy is strongly associated in the 
first place with kinship ties and obligations, but in most societies, and particularly in the richer 
countries, the extended family is becoming weaker, and some new family forms are emerging as 
second and third marriages become more common, and as tolerance grows for phenomena such 
as gay parenting and cross cultural adoption.68  Migration can make relatives not only literally 
but also figuratively more distant.  For international migrant labourers of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, family bonds and loyalties may in some ways have actually been reinforced 
by the hostility and discrimination they encountered in host communities; but the context is 
utterly different for today’s American born Chinese college graduates. Our research has been far 
too slender to say what kind of philanthropic patterns this may produce in relation to China.  As 
noted, the mainland receives a flow of curious and well-intentioned young people of Chinese 
origin who come with some hope of getting to know and also making some contribution to their 
ancestral home. But this is quite probably counterbalanced, and even outweighed, by those who 
are more concerned to develop their careers in the countries where they were born.  
 
New migrants probably represent the largest future frontier for donations to China.  Undoubtedly 
the Chinese state will vigorously court them as future reservoirs of intellectual and financial 
capital. This is likely to result in a greater degree of transnationalism, with an international elite 
increasingly free to cross borders as it chooses.  The consequences for philanthropy are by no 
means clear, except that a great deal of new wealth will certainly be created.  This will provide 
opportunities for those with the imagination and determination to reach out for it, although 
China’s most needy communities will find it hardest to reach that far.  
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